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Since its publication in 2005,
1 the Groningen
Protocol has been under fire both in the
Netherlands and outside it. The purpose of the
protocol is to set a standard of practice for doctors to
responsibly end the lives of severely impaired new-
borns, but it also lays out procedures for reporting
doctors’ decisions to authorities. Doctors who end
the life of a baby must report the death to the local
medical examiner, who in turn reports it to both the
district attorney and to a recently created review
committee. (The procedure differs in this respect
from the black-letter law governing voluntary eu-
thanasia. There, the medical examiner sends the re-
port only to the regional review committee, which
alerts the district attorney only if it judges that the
physician acted improperly.) The protocol was creat-
ed by a committee of physicians and others at the
University Medical Center Groningen in consulta-
tion with the Groningen district attorney and has
been ratified by the National Association of Pediatri-
cians, but it does not give physicians unassailable
legal protection. Case law has so far protected physi-
cians from prosecution as long as they act in accor-
dance with the protocol, but no black-letter law ex-
ists in this area.
The protocol stands accused of various crimes: (1)
it is aimed primarily at babies with spina bifida,
many of whom could lead satisfactory lives;2 (2) it
fails to distinguish with clinical precision between
babies whose prognosis of death is certain and those
who could continue to live;3 (3) it allows parents to
commit infanticide as a means of escaping an un-
wanted burden of care;4 (4) it lets doctors decide
what is an acceptable quality of life;5 (5) it lets doc-
tors determine the morality of their own actions;6 (6)
it provides a purely procedural response to the prob-
lem of measuring subjective suffering;7 (7) it con-
Several criticisms of the Groningen Protocol rest on misunderstandings about how it works or which
babies it concerns. Some other objectionsabout quality-of-life judgments and parents role in making
decisions about their childrencannot be easily cleared away, but at least in the context of Dutch culture
and medicine, the protocol is acceptable.
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dones infanticide rather than prevent-
ing spina bifida or promoting its early
detection via fetal ultrasound, fol-
lowed by abortion;8 and (8) it offers
an incoherent criterion for deciding
whether to end an infant’s life—it re-
quires that the infant experience
“hopeless and unbearable suffering,”
but neonates cannot suffer because
they lack the ability to realize inten-
tions, desires, and hopes for the fu-
ture.9
Many of these claims rest on a se-
rious misunderstanding and, togeth-
er, they give a highly distorted picture
of the protocol. In this paper we at-
tempt to clear up these misunder-
standings by several acts of transla-
tion: we render into English the
Dutch words in which the protocol
was written, but at the same time we
try to convey to an English-speaking
readership the relevant aspects of the
Dutch cultural and social background
that make those words intelligible.
And then, because we want to make
ethically intelligible the practice that
the protocol is intended to guide, we
engage in a further act of transla-
tion—first we explain the shared
moral understandings that form the
context in which Dutch physicians
sometimes end the lives of severely
impaired newborns, and then we
identify the issues for which under-
standings have not, or have not yet,
become shared. Through these trans-
lations we argue for the moral per-
missibility, in the Dutch context, of
physician intervention to bring about
the death of babies who fall within
the category the protocol is meant to
address.
What the Protocol Says
Eduard Verhagen and Pieter Sauer,the two pediatricians at the Uni-
versity Medical Center Groningen
most intimately involved in develop-
ing and publicizing the protocol, have
identified three categories of new-
borns for whom doctors must make
end-of-life decisions.
Group 1 consists of newborns
with no chance of survival. Typically,
they have a fatal disease such as severe
lung or kidney hypoplasia, and they
are put on life support immediately
after birth while their physicians de-
termine the extent of the damage.
While “in some cases they can be
kept alive for a short period of time, 
. . . when the futility of the treatment
is apparent, the ventilatory support is
removed so that the child can die in
the arms of the mother or father.”10
The decision to withhold or with-
draw treatment in this group is, as
Verhagen and Sauer correctly note,
acceptable for physicians in Europe as
well as in the United States. Indeed,
once it is clear that the newborn has
no chance for survival, to continue or
even to start treatment would be
medically irresponsible.
However, if the baby does not die
immediately after life support is re-
moved, the doctors could face a se-
vere moral conflict. On the one hand,
they are morally and legally bound to
relieve suffering; on the other, they
are bound to preserve and protect the
infant’s life. In the United States, doc-
tors in the throes of this dilemma
may not intervene to hasten the
baby’s death. In the Netherlands,
however, the deliberate ending of a
life is countenanced as morally and
legally justified. Because infants be-
longing to group 1 cannot live very
long no matter what treatment they
receive, the decision about terminat-
ing their lives is only a decision about
the time of dying, not about whether
it is better for them to die. No quali-
ty-of-life judgments are involved.
Group 2 consists of infants who
“may survive after a period of inten-
sive treatment, but expectations re-
garding their future condition are
very grim.”11 They include infants
with severe brain abnormalities or ex-
tensive organ damage caused by lack
of oxygen. The dilemma here is
whether these infants are so badly off
that they should be allowed to die. In
the Netherlands and in most parts of
Europe, doctors agree that not only
survival but also the quality of the life
is important in deciding whether to
withhold or withdraw treatment. In
the United Kingdom, the Nuffield
Council on Bioethics recently wrote,
“It would not be in the baby’s best in-
terests to insist on the imposition or
continuance of treatment to prolong
the life of the baby when doing so im-
poses an intolerable burden on him
or her.”12 In the United States, too,
there is a consensus regarding the per-
missibility of withholding or with-
drawing life support for babies in this
category.
In the Netherlands, however, if
neither withholding nor withdrawing
intensive treatment will result in a
speedy death, the unbearable suffer-
ing of the infant is seen as a com-
pelling reason for the doctor to end
its life directly. In the United States
this would count as an appalling
breach of medical ethics, as it also
would in the United Kingdom: the
Nuffield Council makes very clear
that “the active ending of neonatal life
CRITICS charge that the protocol does not successfully 
identify which babies will die. But it is precisely those babies
who could continue to live, but whose lives would be
wretched in the extreme, who stand in most need of the 
interventions for which the protocol offers guidance.
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even when that life is ‘intolerable’ is
rejected.”13 But in the Netherlands,
the termination of these infants’ lives
has not caused much controversy.
The decision for deliberately ending
the life of a group 2 baby involves not
only a question of when death should
take place, as is the case for babies in
group 1, but also a value judgment
about the infant’s quality of life: the
baby is judged to be better off dead
than forced to endure the only kind
of life it can ever have.
While the termination of life for
group 2 babies would cause an uproar
in the United States, from the Dutch
point of view the controversial group
is group 3. This group comprises ba-
bies with an extremely poor prognosis
“who do not depend on technology
for physiologic stability and whose
suffering is severe, sustained, and can-
not be alleviated.”14 These are infants
who are not and have not been de-
pendent on intensive medical treat-
ment and who, with proper care, can
in some cases survive many years,
even into adulthood. They have seri-
ous conditions that cannot be treated
but cause terrible suffering, such as
epidermolysis bullosa, which in severe
cases produces large, painful, fluid-
filled blisters and continual scarring
that fuses the fingers and toes and
leads to feeding and swallowing diffi-
culties. Other severe conditions in-
clude progressive paralysis, complete
lifelong dependency, and permanent
inability to communicate in any way.
The Groningen Protocol is applic-
able to all three groups, but because
there is a consensus in the Nether-
lands regarding the moral permissibil-
ity of ending the lives of babies in
groups 1 and 2, critics have particu-
larly attacked the protocol’s applica-
tion to babies in group 3. The proto-
col consists of two sections—one set-
ting out the conditions necessary for
euthanasia to be performed, and the
other detailing the kinds of records
that should be kept “to clarify the de-
cision and facilitate assessment.”15 We
translate it in its entirety (see sidebar).
How the Protocol Was
Developed
To understand the protocol, onemust set it against the backdrop
of the wider Dutch practice of eu-
thanasia and assisted suicide. In the
Netherlands, euthanasia is usually un-
derstood to mean ending the life of
another person at their express re-
quest. Assisted suicide is taken to
mean providing another person with
the means to commit suicide. Under
Article 294 of the Dutch Criminal
Code, suicide is not a criminal of-
fense, but assisted suicide is. Euthana-
sia is likewise a criminal offense under
Article 293 of the Code.
However, since the Termination of
Life on Request and Assisted Suicide
Act went into effect on April 1, 2002,
both of these articles have included
special grounds for immunity from
criminal liability. This means that ter-
mination of life or assisted suicide are
not offenses if performed by doctors
who comply with the “due care” crite-
ria of the act and report their actions
to the medical examiner. The medical
examiner performs an external exam-
ination to ascertain how the patient
died and what substances were used
to terminate life. He or she then
sends all the necessary documents
and any others that may be relevant
to one of the five regional review
committees—each made up of at
least one legal specialist, one physi-
cian, and one expert on ethical or
philosophical issues—whose duty it is
to assess them. On the basis of the
documents, the committee decides
whether the physician acted in accor-
dance with the due care criteria.
About 1,950 cases of euthanasia
are reported to the review committees
every year, and while committees oc-
casionally request additional informa-
tion from a physician, cases are gener-
ally approved without further action.
Most of the physicians who perform
euthanasia are huisartsen (literally,
“house doctors”)—family-care physi-
cians who pay house calls and typical-
ly have an established and ongoing re-
lationship with their patients. Most
of the patients who receive euthanasia
are end-stage cancer patients.
The due care criteria, aimed at in-
suring that euthanasia is correctly
performed, are these: 1) a voluntary
and well-considered patient request;
2) the presence of unbearable suffer-
ing without prospect of improve-
ment; 3) informed consent; 4) no rea-
sonable alternative; 5) consultation
with at least one other independent
physician; and 6) a medically appro-
priate termination of life.
As might have been expected,
much of the language in the proto-
col’s “Requirements” section was
drawn directly from the euthanasia
due care criteria. Provision 1 (that the
request is voluntary) could not be in-
corporated into the protocol, as ba-
bies are incapable of voluntary re-
quests. But provisions 2, 5, and 6—
hopeless and unbearable suffering,
consultation by an independent
physician, and terminating life in a
medically appropriate manner—were
taken over nearly verbatim by the
Groningen committee. Provision 3
(that the patient be informed) was
imported into the Groningen require-
ment that both parents give informed
consent. Provision 4 (no reasonable
alternative) does not appear in the
protocol’s requirements, but under
“Information needed to support and
clarify the decision about euthana-
sia,” alternative treatments are to be
described and presumably judged un-
acceptable.
Where the authors erred, we be-
lieve, is in carrying the language of
“euthanasia” into the protocol. That
word causes confusion because in the
Netherlands it is reserved for termi-
nating the life of a mentally compe-
tent patient at the patient’s consid-
ered request. Babies are not mentally
competent, so they can neither judge
for themselves that their lives are un-
bearable nor request that they be
helped to die. In the case of infants,
then, rather than speak of euthanasia,
we think it is better to use the lan-
guage of “ending life.”
The Groningen committee also re-
lied on legal precedents to develop
H A S T I N G S  C E N T E R  R E P O R T 45January-February 2008
the protocol. In 1996, the courts ac-
quitted doctors in two cases, one in-
volving a newborn with an extreme
form of spina bifida, and the other an
infant with severe trisomy 13. In both
cases, despite palliative care, the ba-
bies suffered extensively and the doc-
tors ended their lives with lethal
drugs. “The courts accepted,” wrote
Verhagen and Sauer, “that the physi-
cians had to choose between the duty
to retain life (and accept the severe
suffering) and the duty to limit the
suffering (and end the life of the
child). They considered the choice to
end the life of the infants justified be-
cause there was no alternative.”16
There is, of course, an alternative;
what Verhagen and Sauer meant to
say is that the alternative is worse than
death. What is important here, how-
ever, is that in both cases the decision
to deliberately end life was made only
after it had been decided that all other
medical treatments should be with-
drawn. Neither baby fell into the cat-
egory of group 3.
Finally, the Groningen committee
considered twenty-two instances of
life-ending interventions that were re-
ported to district attorneys’ offices be-
tween 1997 and 2004, all involving
“infants with very severe forms of
spina bifida.”17 Again, in all these
precedents, the decision to end life
was preceded by a decision to with-
hold further life-sustaining treatment.
The prosecutor assessed each case by
means of four criteria: whether the
babies had endured hopeless and un-
bearable suffering and a very poor
quality of life, whether the parents
had consented, whether an indepen-
dent physician had been consulted,
and whether the physician had ended
the infants’ lives in accordance with
proper medical standards. None of
the physicians were prosecuted.
How the Protocol Is
Misunderstood
While some of the criticisms thathave been leveled against the
protocol are based on genuine moral
disagreements, others seem to rest on
The Groningen Protocol for Euthanasia in Newborns
Requirements that must be fulfilled
The diagnosis and prognosis must be certain
Hopeless and unbearable suffering must be present
The diagnosis, prognosis, and unbearable suffering must be confirmed 
by at least one independent doctor
Both parents must give informed consent
The procedure must be performed in accordance with the accepted
medical standard
Information needed to support and clarify the decision about euthanasia
Diagnosis and prognosis
Describe all relevant medical data and the results of diagnostic 
investigations used to establish the diagnosis
List all the participants in the decision-making process, all opinions 
expressed, and the final consensus
Describe how the prognosis regarding long-term health was assessed
Describe how the degree of suffering and life expectancy were assessed
Describe the availability of alternative treatments, alternative means of 
alleviating suffering, or both
Describe treatments and the results of treatment preceding the decision 
about euthanasia
Euthanasia decision
Describe who initiated the discussion about possible euthanasia and at
what moment
List the considerations that prompted the decision
List all the participants in the decision-making process, all opinions 
expressed, and the final consensus
Describe the way in which the parents were informed and their opinions
Consultation
Describe the physician or physicians who gave a second opinion (name 
and qualifications)
List the results of the examinations and the recommendations made by 
the consulting physician or physicians
Implementation
Describe the actual euthanasia procedure (time, place, participants, and 
administration of drugs)
Describe the reasons for the chosen method of euthanasia
Steps taken after death
Describe the findings of the coroner
Describe how the euthanasia was reported to the prosecuting authority
Describe how the parents are being supported and counseled
Describe planned follow-up, including case review, postmortem 
examination, and genetic counseling
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misinterpretations, mistranslations,
or other misreadings. Criticisms of
this kind can be readily deflected.
We begin with the confusion that
seems to have arisen over the class of
babies to whom the protocol is ap-
plicable. In this regard, the criticism
that the protocol fails to distinguish
with clinical precision between babies
whose prognosis of death is certain
and those who could continue to live
misses its mark.18 It is precisely those
babies who could continue to live but
whose lives would be wretched in the
extreme who stand in most need of
the interventions for which the proto-
col offers guidance. The whole point
of the protocol is to help physicians
end the lives of newborns who are so
severely afflicted that neither their
dying nor their living should be pro-
longed. That being the case, the perti-
nent distinction is not between babies
who will die and those who could
live, but between babies for whom
life-ending decisions should be made
and those for whom such decisions
cannot be morally justified. In bring-
ing within its compass babies who are
in no danger of dying—and, indeed,
with proper care could live to adult-
hood—the protocol is even more rad-
ical than its critics supposed.
Another misunderstanding regard-
ing the relevant class of babies is that
the protocol is aimed at babies with
spina bifida. In fact, nowhere in the
protocol is spina bifida represented as
a condition associated with an utterly
unacceptable quality of life.19 In our
view, Verhagen and Sauer are partly
responsible for the confusion that has
arisen over this point, because by in-
voking the twenty-two reported cases
of physician aid-in-dying used to de-
velop the protocol, all of which in-
volved infants with spina bifida, they
unintentionally created the impres-
sion that spina bifida per se is para-
digmatic of babies for whom end-of-
life decisions are made. It isn’t. As dis-
senters quickly pointed out, many
people with spina bifida enjoy their
lives, and while “the variable spec-
trum of disabling conditions associat-
ed with spina bifida may cause bur-
dens on parents and society at large,”
society has an obligation to shoulder
that burden.20 We agree, and we have
no reason to doubt that the Gronin-
gen committee shares our view. To
put it as plainly as possible, the proto-
col is not intended for disabled babies
with even modest prospects for lives
free of intense suffering. The mere
presence of a disability is no more rel-
evant to an end-of-life decision than
is a sprained ankle.
We take seriously the social stigma
that attaches to people with disability
and the disgraceful history of medical
mistreatment that is a particularly vi-
cious manifestation of that stigma. As
we see it, however, the Groningen
Protocol guards against the abuse of
people with disabilities because it sets
out clear requirements for the condi-
tion—dire in the extreme—that a
baby must be in before ending its life
is permitted.
A further point can be made here.
The supposedly morally superior al-
ternative to the actions governed by
the protocol, of promoting the detec-
tion of spina bifida in utero and
aborting affected fetuses,21 does not
strike us as superior at all. Because
there is a very broad range in the de-
gree to which spina bifida disables
people or requires painful treatment,
and because a great many people who
have the condition live perfectly satis-
factory lives, we join disability ac-
tivists who condemn the routine rec-
ommendation of abortions per-
formed for no other reason than to
prevent the birth of an affected baby.
A third criticism rests on a confu-
sion over how the protocol operates.
It is not, nor could it be, purely pro-
cedural.22 The protocol is intended to
make the decision-making process
more transparent, but this does not at
all mean that the decisions themselves
can be arrived at by ticking off a pro-
cedural checklist. Determining
whether a baby’s suffering is intolera-
ble, whether a diagnosis and progno-
sis are reliable, whether or to what de-
gree a treatment might be efficacious,
whether a mother and father are fully
appraised of their baby’s condition
and what it means—all this requires a
sophisticated knowledge of medicine,
a good deal of experience, and above
all, judgment. While the protocol
serves to guide physicians’ delibera-
tions on these matters by itemizing
what needs to be thought about and
what needs to be done, it also per-
forms what is perhaps an even more
useful function: it allows doctors to
be openly accountable for their deci-
sions to all members of society.
The importance of this account-
ability cannot be overestimated be-
cause unlike malpractice-minded
Americans, Dutch people by and
large trust their doctors. The Nether-
lands is not a particularly litigious so-
ciety, nor are its physicians as trou-
bled by the pressures of big pharma,
entrepreneurial conflicts of interest,
and inequities in the health care deliv-
ery system that have eroded the doc-
tor-patient relationship in the United
States. But the trust between the
Dutch people and their physicians
does not exist merely in the absence
of reasons for distrust; it is deliberate-
ly cultivated as a socially valuable
good. Much about Dutch medical
practice—house calls, adequate fund-
ing for mental health care, the fact
that 30 percent of babies are delivered
at home—helps maintain the confi-
dence the Dutch public reposes in its
doctors. The transparency of the
process of reflection and action re-
quired by the Groningen Protocol
serves as another mechanism for nur-
turing and strengthening this trust.
Lingering Problems with the
Protocol
While criticisms based on mis-readings of the protocol are
easily cleared up, other concerns still
remain. These have largely to do with
quality-of-life judgments and with
the role of the parents.
Quality-of-life judgments. The
protocol requires that “hopeless and
unbearable suffering” be present. But
hopelessness worries some critics of
the protocol because it seems far too
subjective for ending the life of an-
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other human being.23 My reason for
losing hope might be your reason to
press on; what plunges me into hope-
lessness may stiffen your spine.
We believe that the brunt of this
criticism can be deflected by consid-
ering the Dutch word from which the
English one was translated. That
word is uitzichtloos, which literally
means “outlook-less,” or, in better
English, “without prospect.” While
not all are hopeful who have reason to
hope, and some continue to hope
when all hope is gone, agreement can
be reached concerning a baby’s
prospects for improvement. Parents
and physicians alike may hope the
baby will get better while agreeing
that there is no prospect of it. It’s true
that the determination that there is
no prospect is a judgment, not a self-
evident fact, but it is a judgment that
will have been based on clinical data
and medical expertise, and it will have
been confirmed by a second, inde-
pendent opinion.
The harder quality-of-life judg-
ment to establish is that of unbearable
suffering.24 How can I know what you
cannot bear unless you tell me, and if
you’re a newborn baby, how can you
tell me? Unbearable, like hopeless,
strikes some critics as an unacceptably
subjective criterion. Nor does suffer-
ing fare any better. It has become a
bioethical commonplace to distin-
guish suffering, which is subjective,
from pain, which is not. Pain, it is
said, is “the awareness of reports of
tissue damage or threat of tissue dam-
age in the central nervous system.”25
It is a sensation caused by physiologi-
cal phenomena. Suffering can be dis-
tinguished from pain, according to
Eric Cassell’s well-known formula-
tion, as “the state of severe distress as-
sociated with events that threaten the
intactness of the person.”26 It is
awareness of the disintegration, or the
danger of disintegration, of one’s
sense of self.
If one accepts this distinction, the
difficulty with the protocol becomes
obvious: infants, whose psychologies
are not yet complex enough to pro-
duce a sense of self and who do not
experience themselves as intact per-
sons, are incapable of suffering. As the
objection has it, criteria based on suf-
fering, if they are to be used at all,
must be reserved for euthanasia be-
cause criteria of this kind could only
be applicable to people with self-con-
cepts and the ability to report what
they feel.27
While Cassell’s distinction can be
most helpful in some contexts, we see
no particular reason to follow it here.
There is a perfectly ordinary sense in
both English and Dutch in which one
can suffer pain—just as one can suffer
humiliation, cold, fools gladly, or the
consequences. Babies, being babies,
are severely limited in the range of
things they can suffer, but they can
certainly suffer pain, and to excruciat-
ing degrees. These degrees are observ-
able and measurable and do not re-
quire a self-concept or self-reporting
to be accurately assessed. In the ab-
sence of untenable assumptions about
the impossibility of knowing what is
in another person’s mind, the objec-
tion about the subjectivity of the lan-
guage of unbearable suffering does
not seem persuasive, at least with re-
gard to pain.
The trouble, though, is that the
protocol has been taken to apply not
only to pain, but also to other kinds
of serious and unrelievable condi-
tions—total lifelong dependency, for
example, or lack of any capacity for
communication, or progressive paral-
ysis resulting in total immobility. The
protocol thus leaves room for cases in
which the suffering will take place in
the future. This forward-looking fea-
ture of the protocol is justified on the
grounds that it is inhumane to keep a
baby alive until it begins to experi-
ence intolerable suffering.
It also raises two sorts of difficul-
ties. The first has to do with whether
physicians ought to be in the business
of mounting lethal preemptive strikes
before any actual suffering has oc-
curred. In September 2006, the Min-
istry of Health Care empanelled the
review committee we mentioned ear-
lier—a group of experts (a lawyer, an
ethicist, and several physicians)
charged with retrospectively assessing
cases in which physicians have ended
the lives of severely impaired new-
borns. Once the committee has spo-
ken, it sends its judgment to the dis-
trict attorney, who has already re-
ceived a report of the death. The dis-
trict attorney, on the basis of the re-
view committee’s recommendation,
then decides whether to act on the
case. Thus, the review committee here
acts solely in an advisory capacity. It
differs in that respect from the region-
al euthanasia committees, which, be-
cause they report cases of improperly
administered euthanasia to the dis-
trict attorney, serve in a prosecutorial
capacity. But while the review com-
mittee for ending the lives of infants
does not wield the same power as the
euthanasia review committees, it will,
if it thinks that the physician has
acted improperly, send its judgment
to the Inspector of Health Care—the
government agency whose U.S. ana-
log is the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Healthcare Organiza-
tions and which, like that body, has
the power to shut the hospital down.
The committee uses roughly the same
due care criteria as the euthanasia re-
view committees, adding to those cri-
THE harder quality-of-life judgment to establish is that of
unbearable suffering. How can I know what you cannot bear
unless you tell me, and if you’re a newborn baby, how can
you tell me?
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teria the particular requirements of
the Groningen Protocol. However, it
is not yet clear whether the intense,
unrelievable suffering of the newborn
must be actual, or whether intense,
unrelievable suffering in the near fu-
ture is also acceptable grounds for ter-
minating the newborn’s life.
It is possible that the committee
will come down on the side of cau-
tion, ruling that only actual suffering
provides an acceptable reason.28 But
that, we think, would be a pity. We
can see no reason why, in at least
some cases, the more responsible
course of action might not be to end
an infant’s life in advance of intense,
unrelievable suffering it will otherwise
surely have to endure. For babies who
either cannot be treated at all or who
face a future of one surgery after an-
other, none of which is likely to im-
prove the quality of their lives to any
marked degree, the prevention of later
suffering that cannot be alleviated
would seem to be just as morally valu-
able as the relief of present unbearable
pain. It is of course true that some of
these babies—those, for example,
who face complete lifelong dependen-
cy—might, if kept alive, judge as
adults that their lives had been worth
something to them. Much would de-
pend, one supposes, on how much
pain and other kinds of suffering they
had to endure to get to adulthood.
But that consideration is no reason to
proscribe all life-ending interventions
on the basis of future suffering.
It is a matter of the greatest impor-
tance that more research be conduct-
ed to better determine what it is to
live with conditions that cause serious
suffering other than pain. In the ab-
sence of such research, physicians
might succumb to the biases of the
able-bodied, who tend to think dis-
ability is much worse than disabled
people actually find it. That said, the
fact remains that on rare occasions, a
doctor can find herself in a situation
in which she has good reason to be-
lieve that her obligation to prevent
suffering outweighs her duty to pro-
tect her newborn patient’s life.
The second concern raised by the
protocol’s stance that physicians may
base end-of-life decisions on future
suffering is the morally hazardous na-
ture in general of making quality-of-
life judgments for others. Aid in
dying for patients who rationally re-
quest it can be justified by appealing
to the moral concept of respect for au-
tonomy. Such patients have weighed
the quality of their current state
against what they have to look for-
ward to, and they decided for them-
selves that the game is no longer
worth the candle. They are in the best
position, both morally and epistemi-
cally, to intentionally lay down a bur-
den that has become too heavy for
them. Deciding for others that they
have (or will have) an unacceptable
quality of life is quite another matter.
It seems the height of arrogance to
conclude that someone else’s life is
not worth living, and even worse to
deprive the person of all her experi-
ences, possibilities, and relationships
on the basis of that conclusion.
On the other hand, where there is
a socially shared understanding that
death is not the worst thing that can
befall a human being, quality-of-life
judgments cannot be evaded. Ad-
vances in medical treatment have
meant that more and more deaths in
developed nations must be negotiat-
ed. These negotiations often require
family members, in consultation with
health care professionals, to decide
when an uncomprehending patient’s
life is no longer of value to him. In
the United States, where fully one-
fourth of all people die in intensive
care units,29 these decisions on behalf
of others routinely result in withdraw-
ing or withholding further life-sus-
taining treatment so that the patient
may die. In the Netherlands, too,
there is a shared understanding that
families may need to pass judgment
on a loved one’s quality of life so that
life-sustaining treatment can be re-
fused or withdrawn.
Where the Dutch go further than
other countries is in their shared belief
that even newborns have a fundamen-
tal interest in not prolonging a life
that is or will become an intolerable
burden to them. This understanding
is buttressed by a consensus—within
the National Association of Pediatri-
cians, for example, but also in the
wider community—on some criteria
regarding quality of life, including the
amount of suffering that is to be ac-
cepted, the capacities for communica-
tion (nonverbally as well as verbally),
the capacities to live a self-supporting
life, and the dependency on care insti-
tutions. It is one of the harsh realities
of twenty-first-century medicine that
quality-of-life judgments must be
made. What we must not do is pre-
tend that we do not already make
them, and that there is somehow
something morally different about
doing it for a newborn baby.
One might object that even if we
do make quality-of-life judgments for
others, there is surely a moral differ-
ence between killing and letting die.
In fact, sometimes there is, and some-
times there isn’t. As James Rachels has
famously argued, whether you drown
your six-year-old nephew in the bath-
tub so that you can collect his inheri-
tance or merely refuse to intervene as
he slips and hits his head and falls face
down into the bathwater, either way
you are a murderer.30 We agree with
Rachels that actively ending a life can
sometimes be more humane than
waiting for the person to die, and that
in the desperate cases where death
does not come of its own accord to
end unendurable suffering, the moral-
ly right thing to do is to summon it.
We realize that this is controversial.
The recent report of the Nuffield
Council argues that permitting doc-
tors to end neonatal life deliberately
would likely not only cause psycho-
logical harm to the doctors who do it,
but also have a negative impact on
how the medical profession is per-
ceived more widely. Parents in partic-
ular might lose their trust in doc-
tors.31 Again, we think that this argu-
ment underestimates the difficulty
doctors themselves experience when
they come to their decisions. Every
doctor will testify that the deliberate
killing of a child is very hard. But in
these cases, a conflict of duties has
been judged to exist, and the need to
relieve the baby’s severe suffering has
outweighed the need to protect its
life.
The role of parents. Another lin-
gering concern has to do with the
parents’ role in these life-ending deci-
sions. Because parents bear the re-
sponsibility of caring for their chil-
dren and may find the care of severe-
ly impaired children burdensome in
the extreme, the objection has been
raised that the parents of such babies
have a conflict of interest: they will be
tempted to kill the baby so they don’t
have to look after it.32
Two points are worth making
here. First, “parents” is generally a eu-
phemism for “mothers.” In the
Netherlands as everywhere else, by far
the greatest amount of responsibility
for the care of infants is assigned to
their mothers, regardless of whether
the father is present in the household
or the mother works full time outside
the home. When infants are disabled,
the mother is almost always the full-
time caregiver.33 Yet who is worried
about conflict of interest? Of the five
authors who to our knowledge have
voiced this objection—Alan B.
Jotkowitz, Shimon Glick, Frank A.
Chervenak, Laurence B. McCul-
lough, and Birgit Arabin—all but
one are men. Because childcare (let
alone familial care of badly damaged
children) is socially disvalued and
heavily gendered, it is unseemly, to
say no more, for those who are nei-
ther expected nor likely to do it to at-
tribute malign intentions to those
who must.
This is, of course, an ad hominem
argument. But it is also an appeal to
attend to the social context in which
the objection is raised, and to the po-
sition of social immunity from ma-
ternal responsibility enjoyed by those
who raise it. We take seriously the
“epistemology of ignorance”34 that al-
lows some people not to have to no-
tice social arrangements that are un-
comfortable or awkward: often, what
social privilege amounts to is not
being forced to acknowledge things
that it would be inconvenient to bear
in mind. And we suspect that this is
what has happened here. The criti-
cism that the protocol allows parents
to wiggle out from under the respon-
sibility to look after their disabled
children strikes us as both unmotivat-
ed and mean-spirited: it does not take
seriously either children with disabili-
ties or the mothers who care for
them.
The second point is that parental
conflicts of interest arise routinely, yet
responsibility for the care of the
young continues to be assigned to
their progenitors. Absent evidence to
the contrary, parents are trusted not
to abuse or neglect their offspring de-
spite the many occasions on which it
would be convenient or financially
remunerative to put their own inter-
ests first. We do not assume that par-
ents shouldn’t be trusted with the
care of their five-year-old simply be-
cause they could leave the child un-
tended while they go out for a night
on the town, nor do detectives follow
a new mother home from the hospi-
tal to make sure she doesn’t skimp on
her baby’s formula to avoid a dip in
her disposable income. To create
public policy on the assumption that
parents are likely to sacrifice their
desperately ill child’s interests to their
own would be to overturn deep-seat-
ed, widely shared understandings
about who is responsible for the care
of the young. Concern about conflict
of interest in parents’ making end-of-
life decisions of any kind for their
children needs to be specific and sub-
stantial, not general and notional.35
Parents play a role in these life-
ending decisions that no one else—
not even the most caring physicians
or dedicated nurses—can fill. They
are ordinarily the initiators and major
contributors to the long process of
shaping their children’s selves, en-
veloping their children with their
own “thick” normative framework
and in that way giving them some
rich and comprehensive notion of
what matters in life. Because they so
directly mark the child in its first few
years when children are at their most
receptive, parents provide a window
into the values and settled prefer-
ences, the particular outlook on life,
that might well characterize the child
when grown. It is a tiny window,
smudged and dim, but it is the closest
glimpse we have into the assessments
their baby might itself make about
the quality of its life.36 When parents
make decisions about the treatment
of babies who are very badly dam-
aged, then, they do not and should
not decide on the basis of some im-
personal and impartial best-interests
standard. They do it out of an inter-
mingling of selves that marks this
particular baby as nested within the
value structure of these particular
parents, uniquely situated to judge
what quality of life their child would
find unacceptable.
At present, parents in the Nether-
lands may request that their severely
impaired babies’ lives be terminated,
but their request does not automati-
cally prevail. However, if the doctors
believe that the child’s life should be
ended but the parents do not agree,
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ACTIVELY ending a life can sometimes be more humane
than waiting for a person to die, and in the desperate cases
where death does not come of its own accord to end 
unendurable suffering, the morally right thing to do is to
summon it.
the parents’ wishes are honored. One
reason the parental role is limited to
giving or withholding consent may be
that things happen very quickly in a
neonatal intensive care unit: a baby’s
condition can change drastically in a
matter of hours, so that while the
health care professionals remain
abreast of the changes, parents often
have a difficult time keeping up.37
They are, therefore, not always in the
best epistemic position to assess
whether it is time for an end-of-life
decision to be made. A second reason
may be that because physicians are the
ones who actually end the life of the
baby, the decision to do so must be a
joint one.
Nevertheless, we believe that be-
cause parents typically love all their
children, regardless of the children’s
medical needs, and because they are
especially well placed to make judg-
ments about the acceptability of a
given quality of life for their babies, it
is important to include parents in the
decision-making process. Moreover, it
is important to take parents’ interests,
wishes, and fears very seriously. Too
often in the United States, family
members are told that they must not
consider anything but the interests of
the patient; to do otherwise is to court
suspicion of neglect or abuse. Indeed,
in both the United States and the
United Kingdom, this refusal to
countenance informal caregivers’ con-
cerns seems to be a permanent fixture
of bioethics.38 In the Netherlands,
they arrange these matters differently.
Because parents feel that they are
equal partners in the decision-making
process, they seem content to let the
final decision rest with the physicians
who are directly responsible for their
babies’ care.
As our defense of the protocol sug-
gests, we think it is essentially sound,
though no more foolproof than any
set of guidelines can be. Determining
in an instant case whether the proto-
col is applicable will always require
judgment, and because the stakes are
inordinately high no matter what is
decided, the judgment must be made
with fear and trembling. That said,
however, we believe that transparency
in the deliberations concerning the
ending of an infant’s life—which is
just as important as it is in the delib-
erations concerning euthanasia in
adults—is adequately promoted by
the protocol’s requirements.
Concerning the larger question of
whether the practice for which the
protocol was developed can be moral-
ly justified, we think it can—in the
Netherlands, at any rate. When a
tragically impaired infant is born into
a society that is hospitable to its chil-
dren, offers universal access to decent
health care, and promotes an ethos
among its citizens whereby they look
after each other as a matter of course,
we believe that the doctor’s ending the
baby’s life could be the best, most car-
ing response.
As we wrote this paper together, it
was brought home forcibly to each of
us, at different times, just how deep
the cultural and social divide is be-
tween the Netherlands and the Unit-
ed States. Although we are tolerably
well acquainted with each others’
countries and have worked together
for a number of years, we found that
we were continually making assump-
tions that the other didn’t share,
which resulted in a fair amount of
talking past each other. For example,
it took four extended conversations
before we were satisfied that we had
spelled out the differences between
groups 1, 2, and 3 in a way that
would be fully intelligible to an Amer-
ican audience. This experience served
to strengthen our jointly held convic-
tion that if bioethics is to do its prop-
er work of carefully describing and as-
sessing any particular biomedical
practice, it must provide an empirical-
ly saturated (read: culturally nuanced)
and socially situated analysis of that
practice. Sometimes, as in the present
instance, this requires translation—of
cultures as well as concepts. And be-
cause concepts take on whatever
meaning they do against a backdrop
of what Wittgenstein called “forms of
life,”39 we wish to repeat that while we
find it morally permissible for Dutch
doctors to end the lives of severely im-
paired neonates according to the re-
quirements of the Groningen Proto-
col, we are not prepared to suggest
that American physicians should fol-
low suit. The United States has its
own forms of life, and not all of them
support this way of caring for desper-
ately ill infants when there’s nothing
else to be done.
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